[Politics_CurrentEvents_Group] Re: democrats -- the party of low

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Monday, January 24, 2011

 

                           Typical NEOCON response to the question. Ignore FACTS, in favor of pure OPINION. Walt

 

 


--- In Politics_CurrentEvents_Group@yahoogroups.com, "Walt L" <muleshet@...> wrote:
>
>
> Can you NAME the Owners/Publishers of the
> world's 5 biggsst Main Steam Media outlets? Walt
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> --- In Politics_CurrentEvents_Group@yahoogroups.com, "feetballfreak67"
> feetballfreak67@ wrote:
> >
> > The media would have US believe troop casualties are down since GW
> Bush left office but our troops are still dying with minimal media
> coverage the last 2 years. They got their guy in the white house with
> daily coverage of any & all middle east troop injuries but now even
> casualties are ignored by the big networks to have US believe things are
> better. Sad but true
> >
> > http://www.icasualties.org/OEF/Fatalities.aspx
> >
> > --- In Politics_CurrentEvents_Group@yahoogroups.com, Bruce Majors
> majors.bruce@ wrote:
> > >
> > > The Democrats' Model War
> > > [image: Listen to this page using
> > >
> ReadSpeaker]<http://app.readspeaker.com/cgi-bin/rsent?customerid=5076&la\
> ng=en_us&readid=wookie&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.atlassociety.org%2Fnode%2F69\
> 0>
> > > By Sherrie
> Gossett<http://www.atlassociety.org/category/tni-article-author/sherrie-\
> gossett>
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> ShareThis<http://www.atlassociety.org/tni/kosovo-bosnia-serbia-balkans-w\
> ar-clinton>
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> > >
> > > January 2007 --The 2006 U.S. elections, which put the Democrats in
> charge of
> > > the House and Senate, were widely described in media as a referendum
> on the
> > > Iraq war. Intense media scrutiny had resulted in critical reports on
> pre-war
> > > intelligence, the decision-making process that preceded the war, the
> postwar
> > > plan, and an unfolding civil war.
> > >
> > > Books with titles such as *Fiasco*,* Imperial Hubris*, and
> *Colossus*described
> > > an America in denial of imperial ambitions that were destined to
> fail. Their
> > > authors and others ascribed to the U.S. such motives as arrogance
> and a
> > > willful refusal to learn from history. They characterized American
> foreign
> > > policy as an effort to impose democracy at gunpoint upon cultures
> either
> > > lacking democracy’s fundamental precursors or just plain
> unwilling to abide
> > > by them. Prior to the election, Americans also heard multiple media
> reports
> > > of the worst unintended consequence of the war: the multiplying of
> the ranks
> > > of terrorists.
> > >
> > > By election day, national polls indicated 60 percent of voters
> believed that
> > > the war had not improved the long-term security of the U.S., and 55
> percent
> > > thought that the U.S. should pull some or all of its troops from
> Iraq. The
> > > Democrats worked to further the discontent and clearly profited by
> it.
> > >
> > > However, if the election was a vote of no confidence in the
> administration’s
> > > conduct of the war in Iraq, it left unanswered the question of what
> the
> > > Democrats would view as an appropriate use of American military
> force in the
> > > world. It’s a question most Democrats have preferred to
> dodge, but they have
> > > given us some disquieting clues.
> > > What would Democrats view as an appropriate use of American military
> force?
> > >
> > > Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton, the front-runner in national polls
> for the
> > > 2008 Democratic presidential nomination, has said openly what many
> Democrats
> > > think: Democrats go to war for the right reasons and prosecute war
> more
> > > successfully. Prior to the 2000 presidential election, Senator
> Clinton cited
> > > the American military campaigns in Bosnia and Kosovo as models of
> foreign
> > > engagements that she favored on moral and strategic grounds.
> > >
> > > “I am a strong proponent of a national defense that is
> smart,” she told CNN
> > > in August 2004. “What we need to be focused on is which
> president is more
> > > likely to make decisions that will achieve our objectives with
> putting the
> > > least amount of lives at risk,” she said, adding, “You
> know, we were
> > > successful in Kosovoâ€"and we didn’t lose a single
> American military person.”
> > >
> > > That view has been echoed by many other Democrats and some
> Republicans, too.
> > > Praising the Kosovo operations, former president Bill Clinton has
> even
> > > suggested that, under a Democrat administration, more such
> operations may be
> > > on the way.
> > >
> > > So, what are these “objectives” that Senator Clinton
> alluded to? What would
> > > future war-fighting look like according to the Clinton doctrine? One
> has
> > > only to look at Kosovo to see the blueprint and organizing principle
> behind
> > > what could become the long-term future of U.S. foreign policy under
> the
> > > Democrats.
> > > A Disputed Land
> > >
> > > Approximately the size of Connecticut, Kosovo is a province within
> the
> > > Republic of Serbia, an Eastern European country that controls one of
> the
> > > major land routes from Western Europe to Turkey and the Near East.
> Like the
> > > rest of what used to be Yugoslavia, Kosovo had a rich mix of ethnic
> groups
> > > and different nationalities. Ethnic Albanians, who are predominantly
> Muslim,
> > > make up the majority of a population of around two million. The
> presence of
> > > many Albanian Muslims and the Ottoman Turks over the centuries has
> left a
> > > countryside dotted with mosques. Meanwhile, the predominantly
> Orthodox
> > > Christian Serbs form the largest minority group. For them,
> Kosovoâ€"home of
> > > the Patriarchate of Peć, the equivalent of the Vatican for
> Orthodox
> > > Christianityâ€"is the center of their religious and national
> identity, both
> > > their Jerusalem and their Alamo. Other minorities present include
> the
> > > Montenegrins, Turks, Croats, Ashkali, Roma (Gypsies), and Muslim
> Slavs.
> > >
> > > In previous centuries, the Serbs had been the most populous group in
> Kosovo,
> > > but over the years were driven out in large numbers. One reason was
> brutal
> > > treatment during World War II, when Nazi and Italian troops invaded
> > > Yugoslavia. Kosovo Albanians sided with the Axis Powers, helped
> raise an SS
> > > *Skanderbeg *division, and began a systematic slaughter and ethnic
> cleansing
> > > of Serbs, Jews, and other minorities. The fact that Albanians in the
> 1980s
> > > had the highest birth rate in Europe also contributed to the fateful
> > > demographic shift.
> > > Yugoslavia , Post-Tito
> > >
> > > In the aftermath of World War II, Yugoslavia became a socialist
> successor
> > > state to the monarchic Kingdom of Yugoslavia, formed after World War
> I.
> > > Under Marshal Tito, Yugoslavia’s many ethnic, national, and
> religious groups
> > > were held in check with an iron hand and cynical machinations, which
> > > included playing one ethnic group against another. So it’s
> not surprising
> > > that in the power vacuum created when Tito died on May 4, 1980,
> thousands of
> > > students poured into the streets of Kosovo’s capital,
> Pristina, demanding
> > > that Kosovo be made an independent republic. News outlets and
> analysts
> > > reported that some Albanians wanted republic status so that they
> could
> > > secede and become part of neighboring Albania, then the most
> orthodox
> > > Communist country in the region.
> > >
> > > As this movement spread, a ruthless crackdown from Belgrade
> followed. In
> > > 1981, Albanian riots broke out and were put down violently by
> Yugoslav
> > > forces. Kosovo came under virtual military rule, with curfews and
> other
> > > emergency measures provoking more resentment. The discontent was
> compounded
> > > by a country-wide financial crisis. Despite large-scale national
> investment
> > > in Kosovo, and the fact that the province received the lion’s
> share of all
> > > federal aid in the country, unemployment ran at 40 percent.
> > >
> > > A mass exodus of Serbs was underway by 1986, when Reuters quoted a
> Western
> > > diplomat saying that Kosovo was a “powder keg” and
> officials were
> > > “struggling to keep the lid on.” “For the Serbs
> who have remained,
> > > frustrated Albanian youth have kept up a steady harassment ranging
> from the
> > > painting of hostile slogans on Serb homes and vandalism of Serb
> graveyards
> > > to beatings and rapes,” the *Washington Post* reported. The
> following year,
> > > the *New York Times*concluded that:
> > >
> > > Ethnic Albanians already control almost every phase of life in the
> > > autonomous province of Kosovo, including the police, the judiciary,
> civil
> > > service, schools and factories. Non-Albanian visitors almost
> immediately
> > > feel the independenceâ€"and suspicionâ€"of the ethnic
> Albanian authorities.
> > >
> > > An official inquiry found that local security and justice bodies had
> let
> > > Albanian offenses against Serbs go unchecked, including rape,
> assault,
> > > arson, intimidation, and property offenses. The finding led to a
> purge of
> > > the Kosovo judiciary and police. But 1987 saw a return of the worst
> violence
> > > since the riots initially broke out.
> > > Enter Milošević and the KLA
> > >
> > > The rise of Slobodan Milošević, the Communist Party boss
> who became first
> > > President of Serbia (1989-1997) and then President of Yugoslavia
> > > (1997-2000), evolved in part from his promises to protect Serbs. He
> courted
> > > voters with the “policy of the hard hand.” Under
> Milosevic, Serbia cut back
> > > aid to Kosovo, revoked the province’s autonomy, continued
> meting out harsh
> > > sentences to protestors and struck down ethnic quotas for jobs in
> the
> > > province â€"all of which fueled enormous resentment.
> > >
> > > The 1990s saw the Balkans flare up in a series of civil wars over
> the rise
> > > of Milosevic, various forms of nationalism, and secessionist moves
> by
> > > Slovenia, Macedonia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Later in the
> decade,
> > > Kosovo would become the final battleground before the breakup of the
> former
> > > Yugoslavia, as Milošević (now Yugoslavia’s
> president) and the newly
> > > formed *Ushtria
> > > Çlirimtare e Kosovës* (Kosovo Liberation Army or KLA), an
> armed paramilitary
> > > group, battled ruthlessly for supremacy.
> > > The Albanian mafia reportedly backed secessionist groups in Kosovo.
> > >
> > > As early as February 1995, *Jane’s Intelligence Review
> *reported the rise of
> > > a “Balkan Medellin”â€"namely, the Albanian mafia,
> believed to control 70
> > > percent of the illegal heroin market in Germany and Switzerland.
> Closely
> > > allied with the Sicilian mafia, the Albanian mafia was dominated in
> the
> > > southern Balkans by Kosvar Albanians, and was reported to be
> involved in
> > > gun-running and the financing of the KLA along with other
> secessionist
> > > groups in Kosovo and neighboring Macedonia.
> > >
> > > The group viewed violence as the only effective path to secession
> and proper
> > > rights for the province’s Albanian majority. Despite an
> eclectic composition
> > > that included university students, Marxist-Leninists, and Maoists,
> in
> > > addition to tribal clansmen, the KLA embraced all the ideological
> hallmarks
> > > of a backwards tribalism: ethnic purification, racism, collective
> guilt, and
> > > mob justice.
> > >
> > > The group made its violent debut in February 1996 by bombing several
> camps
> > > housing Serbian refugees from the wars in Croatia and Bosnia. Soon,
> it
> > > claimed responsibility for deadly ambushes of policemen, kidnappings
> of
> > > Serbs, and murders of Albanians accused of being traitors. The KLA
> used hand
> > > grenades, bombs, and machine guns in its bloody attacks against
> police,
> > > private citizens, and universities, and human rights workers
> documented KLA
> > > rapes of civilian women. By May 1998, the group controlled about a
> quarter
> > > of Kosovo*.*
> > >
> > > Initially, the Clinton administration opposed the KLA. In 1998, U.S.
> > > Ambassador Robert Gelbard stated, “We condemn very strongly
> terrorist
> > > actions in Kosovo. The UÇK [KLA] is, without any questions, a
> terrorist
> > > group.” On March 4, 1998, State Department spokesman James
> Rubin said the
> > > U.S. had “called on the leaders of the Kosovar-Albanians to
> condemn
> > > terrorist action by the so-called Kosovo Liberation Army.”
> > >
> > > United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1160 (March 31, 1998)
> and 1199
> > > (September 23, 1998) also denounced “acts of terrorism by the
> Kosovo
> > > Liberation Army,” as well as “external support”
> for terrorism, including
> > > “financing, arms, and training.” Even-handedly, they
> also condemned
> > > “excessive and indiscriminate use of force by Serbian
> security forces and
> > > the Yugoslav Army.”
> > > The KLA sought to escalate the conflict in order to draw the West
> in.
> > >
> > > A ceasefire was negotiated between the Serbian government and the
> KLA in
> > > late 1998. But simultaneously, the KLA sought to escalate the
> conflict to
> > > the point where they believed the West would feel compelled to
> intervene
> > > against Milošević’s pro-Serb regime on behalf of ethnic
> Albanians. According
> > > to former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, 80 percent of the
> ceasefire
> > > violations in the months preceding the NATO bombing campaign were by
> the
> > > KLA. Their battles with Milošević’s forces were
> characterized by grim
> > > atrocities on both sides; but increasingly cruel retaliation by
> Milošević’s
> > > thuggish forces soon received the lion’s share of
> international attention,
> > > as past Serbian victims became perpetrators of new atrocities
> against their
> > > former Albanian victimizers.
> > >
> > > Throughout the last half of 1998, Milošević led an
> especially brutal
> > > offensive against the KLA. Human Rights Watch representatives
> reported that
> > > the special forces of the Serbian police, the Yugoslav Army, and
> > > anti-terrorist forces were responsible for summary executions and
> > > indiscriminate attacks on civilians, including ax murders and the
> slitting
> > > of throats. Milošević’s forces also engaged in
> systematic destruction of
> > > civilian property, contaminating wells, burning crops and homes
> (sometimes
> > > with people inside), and shooting livestock. Widespread physical
> abuse of
> > > prisoners and arbitrary detentions were also cited. Father Sava
> Janjicâ€"a
> > > famous blogging “cybermonk” of Decani monastery, who
> offered refuge from
> > > marauding forces to Albanians and Serbs alikeâ€"denounced
> Milošević as the
> > > “cancer of Europe.”
> > >
> > > The escalating ethnic bloodshed evoked outrage from the Clinton
> > > administration and other international leaders. Eastern European and
> NATO
> > > countries expressed concern over the mounting economic and
> public-order
> > > crises caused by tens of thousands of fleeing refugees, and some
> forecast a
> > > potential unfolding of World War III. Even many conservatives
> thought that
> > > the U.S. should take up the defense of the Albanian Muslims against
> the
> > > ruthless onslaught of Milošević’s Christian Serbs,
> though contrarians argued
> > > that intervention itself could touch off a wider war.
> > > From Terrorists to Freedom Fighters
> > >
> > > However understandable the worries about Milošević, what
> did *not *make
> > > sense was the Clinton administration’s sudden about-face
> concerning the KLA.
> > > Abruptly, his administration placed this official
> “terrorist” group on the
> > > fast track to public rehabilitation.
> > >
> > > In the person of Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, the
> administration
> > > offered incentives to the KLA intended to show that Washington was a
> “friend
> > > of Kosovo.” Reported the *New York Times*: “Officers
> in the Kosovo
> > > Liberation Army were sent to the United States for training in
> transforming
> > > themselves from a guerrilla group into a police force or a political
> entity,
> > > much like the African National Congress did in South Africa.”
> > > "Portraying the Serbs as evil and everybody else as good was...
> dishonest."
> > > -U.N. Force Commander Lt. General Satish Numbiar
> > >
> > > During the ongoing carnage, Milošević was portrayed
> exclusively as
> > > *the*villain,
> > > while a contrasting romantic view of the KLA was promoted. By April
> 1999,
> > > U.S. Senator Joseph Lieberman (D-CT) would even claim that
> “the United
> > > States of America and the Kosovo Liberation Army stand for the same
> human
> > > values and principles,” adding: “Fighting for the KLA
> is fighting for human
> > > rights and American values” (*Washington Post*, April 28,
> 1999). That same
> > > month, he and Senator John McCain (R-AZ) proposed legislation *to
> arm* the
> > > KLA, in direct contravention of the Helsinki Accords and previous UN
> > > Security Council Resolutions.
> > >
> > > In February and March 1999, the Clinton administration had sought a
> > > permanent peace agreement in negotiations at Rambouillet, France
> that
> > > included representatives of the KLA. But while Yugoslavia agreed to
> most of
> > > the demands, Milošević balked at allowing NATO troops
> access to Serbia.
> > > An Altruistic Crusade
> > >
> > > Just as President Clinton had previously exhorted NATO to fight for
> Muslims
> > > seeking to form an independent state in Bosnia, he would now call
> for NATO
> > > intervention to defend Albanians seeking to secede from Serbia.
> Between
> > > March and May 1999, NATO bombed Serbia to compel its forces to
> retreat from
> > > Kosovo, where they had been fighting the KLA. Hillary Clinton
> revealed to an
> > > interviewer later that summer that “I urged him [her husband]
> to bomb. You
> > > cannot let this go on at the end of a century that has seen the
> major
> > > holocaust of our time. What do we have NATO for if not to defend our
> way of
> > > life?” The use of the words “*our* way of life”
> to describe civil warfare
> > > between competing gangs in faraway Eastern Europe apparently went
> > > unchallenged.
> > >
> > > The NATO campaign was supposed to be about stopping “ethnic
> cleansing” of
> > > Albanians by Serbs. President Clinton cited, as his rationale,
> “deliberate,
> > > systematic efforts at . . . genocide.” He estimated publicly
> that 100,000
> > > ethnic Albanians had been killed. Before the bombing, NATO spokesman
> Jamie
> > > Shea also said that evidence of mass graves had been found.
> “God knows what
> > > we’re going to find when Kosovo is open again and the
> international war
> > > crimes tribunal is let in.” David Scheffer, then the U.S.
> > > ambassador-at-large for war crimes, declared that as many as
> “225,000 ethnic
> > > Albanian men aged between 14 and 59” may have been killed.
> The estimate
> > > later ballooned to 600,000.
> > > Fear and altruistic sentiments and are poor substitutes for facts.
> > >
> > > In seeking the public’s support for war, Clinton also invoked
> dramatic
> > > memories from World War II. “[We are acting] so that future
> generations of
> > > Americans do not have to cross the Atlantic to fight another
> terrible war…,”
> > > he said. “Our stand in Kosovo is a strategic
> imperative.” On May 14, 1999,
> > > first lady Hillary Clinton visited refugee camps in neighboring
> Macedonia
> > > and told media that the stories she had heard “echoed images
> of the Nazi
> > > era, as depicted in films like *Schindler’s List* or
> *Sophie’s Choice*.” The
> > > war, she said, was about our commitment to “human
> rights.”
> > >
> > > Most of the press uncritically absorbed these notions in stories and
> > > headlines that echoed the Third Reich theme, like “Flight
> from Genocide” and
> > > “Echoes of the Holocaust.” The specter of mass
> butchery and the evocation of
> > > painful memories of the Nazi death camps stirred feelings of
> compassion in
> > > the American people.
> > >
> > > But fear and altruistic sentiments and are poor substitutes for
> facts and
> > > rational self-interest, and constitute dangerous grounds for going
> to war.
> > > “Propaganda War”
> > >
> > > There was no direct or obvious benefit to the U.S. in bombing
> Milošević’s
> > > forces in Kosovoâ€"simply because there was no *good *side to
> support in the
> > > conflict. By all informed accounts, the violence in the Balkans in
> the 1990s
> > > was a three-sided civil war, with brutality and atrocities committed
> > > mutually by the Croats, Bosniaks, and Serbs. Moreover, prescient
> analysts
> > > warned that while there was plenty of bloodshed in the unrest, there
> was no
> > > clear evidence of “genocide” in Kosovo, and that
> military intervention could
> > > have grave and unintended consequences for the region.
> > >
> > > In fact, within weeks of the bombing campaign, pre-war
> “genocide” claims of
> > > hundreds of thousands of victims were scaled downward dramatically.
> A
> > > subsequent five-month UN investigation found only 2,108 bodies.
> Similarly,
> > > James Bissett, former Canadian Ambassador to Yugoslavia, Albania,
> and
> > > Bulgaria, later testified: “In the case of Kosovo, it appears
> that about
> > > 2,000 people were killed prior to the NATO bombing. When one
> considers that
> > > a civil war had been going on in Kosovo since 1993, that is not a
> remarkable
> > > figure, certainly not when compared with a lot of other hot spots in
> the
> > > rest of the world.” Recent reports reviewed by this author
> indicate that in
> > > 1999, slightly more than 4,000 Albanians were killed and
> approximately 1,700
> > > non-Albanians were killed. Some 2,500 are still missing, according
> to data
> > > from the Commission for Abducted and Missing Persons.
> > >
> > > Terrible, of course, but a far cry from the slaughter of hundreds of
> > > thousands.
> > > "[W]e did not find oneâ€"not oneâ€"mass grave."
> > > -Investigator Emilio Perez Pujol
> > >
> > > Spanish forensic investigator Emilio Perez Pujol headed a large team
> of
> > > pathologists and police specialists. The search for mass graves, he
> > > explained to the *Sunday Times*, was “a semantic pirouette by
> the war
> > > propaganda machines, because we did not find oneâ€"not
> oneâ€"mass grave…” Pujol
> > > told the *El Pais* newspaper, “We had been working with two
> parallel
> > > problems. One was the propaganda war. This allowed them to lie, to
> fake
> > > photographs for the press, to publish pictures of mass graves, or
> whatever
> > > they had to influence world opinion in favor or against
> Milošević or in
> > > favor of the NATO bombings....”
> > >
> > > “There never was a genocide in Kosovo,” he concluded.
> “It was dishonest and
> > > wrong for western leaders to adopt the term in the beginning to give
> moral
> > > authority to the operation.”
> > >
> > > Shortly after the bombing began, Lt. General Satish Numbiar, a UN
> Force
> > > Commander, wrote:
> > >
> > > Portraying the Serbs as evil and everybody else as good was not only
> > > counter-productive but also dishonest. According to my experience
> all sides
> > > were guilty but only the Serbs would admit they were no angels while
> the
> > > others would insist that they were. With 28,000 forces under me and
> with
> > > constant contacts with UNHCR [the UN Refugee Agency] and the
> International
> > > Red Cross officials, we did not witness any genocide beyond killings
> and
> > > massacres on all sides that are typical of such conflict conditions.
> I
> > > believe none of my successors and their forces saw anything on the
> scale
> > > claimed by media.
> > >
> > > U.S.-Sponsored Ethnic Cleansing
> > >
> > > When the bombing campaign ended, there were no NATO Kosovo Force
> troops on
> > > the ground to preserve order. Infuriated Serbs launched reprisals
> against
> > > Albanians, in an apparent effort to push all the remaining Albanians
> out of
> > > Kosovo. Then came the inevitable backlash: a retaliatory campaign of
> ethnic
> > > cleansing against Serbs and other minorities, carried out by those
> on whose
> > > behalf the U.S. was fighting: the ethnic Albanians.
> > >
> > > In the name of “stopping the genocide,” NATO and the
> UN actually sparked and
> > > presided over one of the worst episodes of ethnic cleansing in
> modern
> > > history. Jiri Dienstbier, the UN special representative on human
> rights in
> > > the former Yugoslavia, put it this way: “[T]he spring ethnic
> cleansing of
> > > ethnic Albanians accompanied by murders, torture, looting and
> burning of
> > > houses has been replaced by the fall ethnic cleansing of Serbs,
> Romas,
> > > Bosniaks and other non-Albanians accompanied by the same
> atrocities.”
> > > Dienstbier reported that the province was left “without a
> legal system,
> > > ruled by illegal structures of the Kosovo Liberation Army and very
> often by
> > > competing mafias.”
> > >
> > > In August 1999, Human Rights Watch estimated that more than 164,000
> Serbs,
> > > Roma (or Gypsies), Ashkali, Croats, Muslim Slavs, and other
> minorities had
> > > been driven out of Kosovo during the wave of violence. That number
> later
> > > grew to an estimated 220,000 who fled Kosovo in fear for their
> lives.
> > > According to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
> (OSCE),
> > > UNMIK (United Nations Interim Mission in Kosovo), KFOR
> (NATO’s Kosovo
> > > Force), and various human rights groups, entire villages were burned
> down
> > > and cities emptied of minorities. Thousands of buildings owned or
> related to
> > > minorities, including homes, churches, seminaries, and cemeteries,
> were
> > > burned, blown up, or otherwise vandalized. Knifings, bombings,
> abductions,
> > > murder, threats, and intimidation have been used to cleanse the
> province of
> > > any remaining minorities.
> > >
> > > Reports by the OSCEâ€"self-described as the world’s
> largest regional security
> > > agencyâ€"documented how minority groups became the targets of
> > >
> > > executions, abductions, torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading
> treatment,
> > > arbitrary arrests…house burnings, blockades restricting
> freedom,
> > > discriminatory treatment in schools, hospitals, humanitarian aid
> > > distribution and other public services…and forced evictions
> from housing.
> > > [T]here are serious indications that the perpetrators of [these]
> human
> > > rights violations are either members of the former KLA, people
> passing
> > > themselves off as members of the former KLA or members of other
> armed
> > > Albanian groups.
> > >
> > > Eventually, KLA members were absorbed into the “Kosovo
> Protection Corps”
> > > (KPC), put on the UN payroll, and tasked with providing emergency
> response
> > > and rebuilding. “We believe the Kosovo Protection Corps will
> make a useful
> > > contribution to the restoration of peace and security for all the
> > > communities of Kosovo and its progress toward democracy,”
> declared Secretary
> > > of State Madeleine Albright.
> > >
> > > However, the UN later reported that KPC members had acted as *de
> facto* police
> > > officers, torturing or killing local citizens, illegally detaining
> others,
> > > extorting “liberation taxes” from businesses, and
> threatening UN police who
> > > attempted to intervene.
> > >
> > > Today, the property rights of minorities have disappeared as ethnic
> > > Albanians help themselves to what’s left of the former
> owners’ cars, homes,
> > > furnishings, and businesses. According to UNMIK’s Housing and
> Property
> > > Department, over 700,000 housing units in Kosovo have been illegally
> > > occupied, along with an unknown number of businesses.
> > >
> > > In many areas, only those incapable of fleeingâ€"the elderly,
> the poor, or
> > > the handicappedâ€"remain, living in ghettoes circled by barbed
> wire and manned
> > > by NATO KFOR checkpoints. Many eke out an existence on the edge of
> survival,
> > > like those who now live in shipping containers donated by Russia.
> Moderate
> > > Albanians have been targeted as well, including those who had been
> content
> > > with Serbia’s rule or who enjoy socializing with Serbs.
> Political rivals
> > > have been assassinated and, in at least one case, dismembered. Many
> Serbs
> > > cannot move about without armed escorts.
> > > Terrorists, Islamists, Gun-Runners
> > >
> > > Meanwhile, European media investigations and statements from law
> > > enforcement officials describe how Kosovo has become an open market
> for
> > > terrorists looking for weapons and explosives, a key global player
> in heroin
> > > trafficking, and the world’s most notorious center for
> sex-slave
> > > trafficking.
> > >
> > > Into this vacuum of lawlessness have come radical Wahhabi Muslim
> groups from
> > > Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. These groups flooded into
> the
> > > area after the bombing and invasion, offering financial aid to
> Albanians,
> > > sometimes on strict conditions: “They had to wear the head
> scarf and bow to
> > > Mecca five times a day, or allow the Wahhabis to build a
> mosque,” former
> > > OSCE official Thomas Gambill recounts. The burly ex-Marine also
> showed this
> > > author security records logging complaints by Albanian school
> teachers who
> > > said they were being kicked out of their classrooms for hours at a
> time, so
> > > that Wahhabis could teach the Koran to their students.
> > >
> > > Gambill’s warnings about the KLA creating new, illegal
> paramilitary groups
> > > were frequently rebuffed. Supposedly disarmed, the KLA merely formed
> other
> > > groups with different names, such as the Albanian National Army. A
> 2003 NATO
> > > map viewed by this author marked the locations of some two dozen
> illegal
> > > paramilitary camps in Kosovo.
> > >
> > > In September 2005, a team of investigative reporters from Dutch
> television
> > > station VPRO produced a documentary showing a robust gun-running
> operation
> > > from a Brooklyn supporter of the KLA. They asked the gun-runner,
> Florin
> > > Krasniqi, about NATO’s claims of having disarmed the KLA.
> “It’s NATO
> > > propaganda,” Krasniqi replied. “NATO can collect a few
> arms. But most
> > > Albanians in Kosovo are very well armed. Just in case NATO pulls
> out, or we
> > > don’t get our independence peacefully, then we’ll use
> those weapons.”
> > > "With money you can do amazing things...Senators and congressmen are
> looking
> > > for donations..."
> > >
> > > -Florin Krasniqi
> > >
> > > The KLA did not forget where its political support originated,
> either. In
> > > the documentary, Krasniqi is shown attending a John Kerry fundraiser
> in New
> > > York with other KLA members and writing checks to the Kerry
> campaign. The
> > > film also shows Krasniqi introducing his group to retired General
> Wesley
> > > Clark, who led the NATO campaign before becoming a Democratic
> presidential
> > > candidate. “Mr. Clark,” he says, “This is your
> group, your KLA.” Clark
> > > responds approvingly: “They fought against tremendous
> odds.”
> > >
> > > “With money you can do amazing things in this
> country,” Krasniqi adds.
> > > “Senators and congressmen are looking for donations. If you
> fund them and
> > > raise the money they need for their campaign, they pay you
> back.”
> > >
> > > Indeed. And it wasn’t just Democrats that raked in Albanian
> donations.
> > > Former Republican Senator Robert Dole, an early supporter, received
> $1.2
> > > million from Albanian lobbies for his 1988 presidential campaign.
> Albanians
> > > even showed their gratitude by naming streets in Kosovo after Dole
> and Bill
> > > Clinton.
> > > Sham Negotiations?
> > >
> > > Kosovo has been a protectorate of the United Nations ever since the
> war,
> > > pending a negotiated resolution of its “final status.”
> At the bargaining
> > > table, the province demands independence from Serbia, while Serbia
> offers a
> > > compromise: “more than autonomy and less than
> independence.”
> > >
> > > Early on, the UN had repeatedly insisted that Kosovo meet certain
> standards
> > > before negotiations over its final status were settled. But after
> seven
> > > years of UN administration and billions of dollars in foreign aid,
> Kosovo
> > > and its international administrators have been unable to
> consistently meet
> > > even the most basic standards set forth in UN Security Council
> resolutions
> > > 1199, 1160, and 1244. Those resolutions demanded the
> demilitarization of
> > > paramilitary groups, an end to “acts of terrorism,”
> the protection of basic
> > > human rights, and safe return of all refugees.
> > >
> > > In October 2005, some six years after Kosovo became a UN
> protectorate,
> > > Norwegian Ambassador to NATO Kai Eide published a review of how
> Kosovo was
> > > meeting UN-set standards. “With regard to the foundation of a
> multi-ethnic
> > > society,” Eide wrote, “the situation is grim.”
> The report called the
> > > continued existence of minority “camps” inside Kosovo
> “a disgrace for the
> > > governing structures and for the international community.”
> The report also
> > > noted that the refugee return process had come to a halt.
> > >
> > > The report also cited “widespread illegal occupation of
> property.”
> > > Prosecution of serious crimes was said to be hindered by hindered by
> “family
> > > or clan solidarity and by the intimidation of witnesses as well as
> of law
> > > enforcement and judicial officials.” Failure to prosecute
> crimes targeting
> > > minorities was said to result in a climate of
> “impunity.”
> > >
> > > The failure of the UN to insist that Kosovo meet minimal civilized
> standards
> > > has convinced some critics that the negotiations are a sham, that
> Kosovo’s
> > > final status has already been decided by the “Contact
> Group,” which
> > > represents major Western powers.
> > >
> > > An email this author received on February 28 from a military
> official
> > > stationed in Kosovo claimed the Contact Group had planned the future
> > > stepping down of Kosovo Prime Minister Barjam Kosumi and his
> replacement by
> > > former KLA commander Agim Ceku. "Agim Ceku will take over prime
> minister
> > > role...Contact Group does not find Kosumi appropriate for status
> talks and
> > > as a leader ...Lufti Haziri will be his deputy, Lufti will mentor
> Ceku,
> > > because Lufti knows how to play politics. Truly amazing ...the
> butcher of
> > > the Serbs in Croatia." The last phrase was a reference to the fact
> Ceku was
> > > wanted by Serbia for alleged war crimes in Croatia. (Ceku vigorously
> denies
> > > the charges.) The day after the email was received, Kosumi resigned
> and was
> > > soon replaced by hardliner Ceku who rejects compromise and insists
> on
> > > independence.
> > >
> > > Sometime in late January, UN envoy Martti Ahtisaari will make a
> > > recommendation on the “final status” of
> Kosovoâ€"namely, whether it should
> > > remain part of Serbia or be granted independence. The Contact Group
> will
> > > make its recommendation on Kosovo’s future after reviewing
> the report. If
> > > Kosovo gains independence, some analysts and political leaders warn
> of
> > > potential destabilization in other troubled parts of the world, as
> various
> > > secessionist movements become emboldened to demand their own
> independence.
> > > This would only exacerbate the process of geopolitical
> disintegration that
> > > philosopher Ayn Rand <http://www.atlassociety.org/tni/ayn_rand>aptly
> > > labeled “global Balkanization.”
> > > Fair Warning
> > >
> > > The disastrous political-cultural outcome of the NATO campaign in
> Serbia
> > > already affords us sobering lessons about the irrationality of
> conducting
> > > military actions on the basis of manipulated evidence, in the
> absence of
> > > contextual understanding of local history, andâ€"most
> importantlyâ€"for motives
> > > other than clear national self-interest. The Kosovo incursion was
> instead
> > > prosecuted as a “war of belief,” argues Gregory
> Copley, a respected
> > > geopolitical analyst and president of the International Strategic
> Studies
> > > Association. Rational criteria for deciding whether to make war were
> > > jettisoned as the Clinton administration opted instead for
> “an approach to
> > > war and strategic affairs which is based solely around
> unsubstantiated
> > > beliefs.”
> > >
> > > The motivational root of those “unsubstantiated
> beliefs” is the philosophy
> > > that extols as “moral” and “idealistic”
> any*selfless* act or policyâ€"i.e.,
> > > any course of action in which the actor has nothing personal to
> gain.
> > >
> > > Observe that while most liberals (and many conservatives) recoil
> from any *
> > > self-interested* projection of American military might abroad, they
> fall all
> > > over themselves to demonstrate “pure, selfless
> motives” by launching
> > > military actions like those in Kosovo, where America had no vital
> interests
> > > at risk, but precious lives and treasure to sacrifice.
> > >
> > > For such people, the hideous real-world consequences of their
> altruistic
> > > crusades pale in the face of their “idealistic”
> motives*. *For them, in
> > > truth, “good intentions” are the *only*
> realityâ€"with “good” being defined as
> > > “selfless.” The logic of the selflessness ethos is
> inescapable: We should
> > > engage in warfare only when we have nothing to gain from it.
> > >
> > > The moral self-deception continues to this day. Even as the brutal
> ethnic
> > > cleansing of Kosovo’s minorities by racists and fascists goes
> on, the
> > > Clintonsâ€"former president and presidential aspirant
> alikeâ€"continue to tout
> > > the military adventure in the Balkans as a victory for
> “democratic values”
> > > of humanitarianism and multicultural tolerance. Their selfless war,
> they
> > > insist, stands as an idealistic model of how a future Democratic
> > > administration should and would employ American military power
> abroad.
> > >
> > > Consider that fair warning.
> > >
> >
>

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